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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
COMMENTARY
CONSIGNMENTS, CREDITORS' RIGHTS AND
U.C.C. SECTION 2-326
Section 2-326 of the Uniform Commercial Code is intended to regulate
the rights and liabilities of parties involved in consignment transactions. 1
It is the purpose of this comment to examine the issues and problems pre-
sented by section 2-326 as interpreted by the courts and to suggest changes
in its provisions in order to fulfill the purposes and policies reflected in the
section.
Prior to the U.C.C. it was generally held that the consignee's creditors
had no claim against the consignor if the consignee's assets were inadequate
to satisfy their respective claims." This was so despite the fact that the
consignor was not required to record the transaction or give notice that he
retained title to the goods.3 The basic reason for ruling in the consignor's
favor was that title had not passed to the consignee and the creditor could
not secure an interest in or attach any goods to which the debtor did not
have title. This decisional law placed a creditor of the consignee in an un-
favorable position, particularly if he had relied on the consignee's possession
of consigned goods and failed to ask for proof of ownership. It was difficult
for a creditor to discover a consignment because the consignor was not re-
quired to give notice in order to protect his interests. For example, if a
consignee presented his goods as collateral for a loan, the creditor who relied
on the consignee's possession would have no protection if the goods involved
were consigned.
The problem raised by reliance on a consignee's possession was aggra-
vated with the adoption of the Code. Section 2-401, by stressing that passage
of indicia of title is no longer essential to the passage of ownership rights,
limited the opportunity for a creditor to rely on a certificate of title as proof
of the consignee's ownership. Thus, with this new emphasis on possession,
even a creditor's request of the consignee to produce his certificate of title
may be futile since legal title can pass without such a certificate.
Section 2-326 is intended to alleviate this problem since its purpose is
to protect creditors from the problems of the consignee's ostensible ownership
1 In the consignment transaction, the consignee does not pay for the goods until they
are sold. What ordinarily happens is that the goods are delivered by the consignor to the
consignee and they remain in the latter's possession until sold or returned. If the goods
do not sell, then the consignee may elect to return them and he pays nothing to the
consignor. See U.C.C. § 2-326, Comment 1. All Code citations are to the 1962 Official
Text, unless otherwise indicated.
2 See, e.g., Ludvigh v. American Woolen Co., 231 U.S. 522 (1913); In re Praegar,
173 F. Supp. 859 (D.N.H. 1958) ; Cobb Exch. Bank v. Byrd, 108 Ga. App. 825, 134
S,E.2d 871 (1964).
3 See Kennedy, Trustee in Bankruptcy Under the U.C.C.: Some Problems Suggested
by Articles 2 and 9, in 1 Secured Transactions Under the U.C.C. 1051, 1103 (1963),
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described above. 4 Treating any consignment not intended as security as a
"sale or return" transaction,5 section 2-326(2) clearly states that goods held
on sale or return are subject to the consignee's creditors while the goods are
in the consignee's possession. Section 2-326(3) sets out general guidelines
for identifying a sale or return transaction,° while subsections (a), (b), and
(c) note methods by which the consignor's interest may be protected.?
While the language of section 2-326 clearly indicates an objective of
compromise between protection of the consignee's creditors and the interest
of the consignor, many problems of interpretation and applicability have
arisen in the pursuit of this objective.
One such problem is determining whether a particular transaction is, in
fact, a sale or return and therefore governed by section 2-326. This prob-
lem arises primarily when the transaction is arguably intended as merely
the retention of a security interest in the goods consigned. Combining the
two applicable sections of the Code, 1-201(37) 8 and 9-102(2),5 it is stated
that whenever the goods are in the possession of the consignee Article 9 will
apply if the consignment is "intended as security," and Article 2 will apply
if the arrangement is not "intended as security." 1° Section 1-201(37) sets
out that consignments are not security interests unless intended as security,
while section 9-102(2) clearly states that Article 9 governs consignments
intended as security.
4 See U.C.C. § 2-326, Comment 2; Hawkland, Consignments under the U.C.C.:
Sales or Security? in Uniform Commercial Code Co-ordinator 395, 400 (1963).
5 See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 1104.
6 U.C.C. § 2-326(3) states:
Where goods are delivered to a person for sale and such person maintains a
place of business at which he deals in goods of the kind involved, under a name
other than the name of the person making delivery, then with respect to claims
of creditors of the person conducting the business the goods are deemed to be
on sale or return. The provisions of this subsection are applicable even though
an agreement purports to reserve title to the person making delivery until pay-
ment or resale or uses such words as "on consignment" or "on memorandum."
However, this subsection is not applicable if the person making delivery
(a) complies with an applicable law providing for a consignor's interest or
the like to be evidenced by a sign, or
(b) establishes that the person conducting the business is generally known
by his creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the goods of
others, or
(c) complies with the filing provisions of the Article on Secured Trans-
actions (Article 9).
7 Hawkland, supra note 4, at 401.
8 U.C.C. § 1-201(37) states, "Unless a lease or consignment is intended as security,
reservation of title thereunder is not a "security interest" but a consignment is in any
event subject to the provisions on consignment sales (Section 2-326)."
9 U.C.C. § 9-102(2) states, "This Article applies to security interests created by con-
tract including . • consignment intended as security."
10 See Hawkland, supra note 4, at 401-03. As Dean Hawkland points out, it is
important to know whether Article 2 or Article 9 applies as they do differ. For example,
§ 2-201 has a $500 minimum in its statute of frauds while § 9-203 has no minimum and
the statute of frauds will apply unless the collateral is in the possession of the con-
signor or the consignee has signed a security agreement. A second difference is that there
are no rules of creditor priority in Article 2 and thus there is no certainty that the
same priority as set out in Article 9 will be followed.
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This problem did not exist under the 1952 Code since section 1-201(37),
at that time, included all consignments as security interests.' Under the
present Code, however, the question of intention is all important and presents
a difficult problem of legal and factual determination. A case exemplifying
this problem is McDonald v. Peoples Auto. Loan & Fin. Corp. 12 in which
cars were delivered to a dealer who obtained a loan on his increased inven-
tory. The wholesaler held the title certificate with the understanding that
they would be delivered to the dealer upon payment of the purchase price.
However, bills of sale were turned over to the dealer and he used these to
obtain the loan. On this one set of facts, the majority and the concurring
opinion reached entirely different results as to the nature of the transaction.
The majority opinion stated, without elaboration, that section 2-326 was in-
applicable and proceeded on the assumption that Article 9 governed the case.
In a similar cursory treatment, the concurring opinion concluded that the
cars were delivered on consignment and therefore section 2-326 should apply.
Neither opinion analysed the type of transaction involved, and the "intended
as security" issue was completely overlooked.
In an effort to avoid mere conjecture as to the question of intention in
each particular case, various tests have been devised by writers and the
courts. One such test, devised by Dean Hawkland, envisions two purposes
of consignments." The first is as a device for consignors to obtain a market
when a dealer is unwilling to risk marketing the goods. 14 In this type of trans-
action, the goods are delivered to the consignee with• the agreement that they
may be returned to the consignor if they fail to sell. Since the consignee does
not pay for the goods until they are sold, the consignor assumes a risk be-
cause he gives up his possession without receiving the "security" of payment.
In place of payment, the law "secures" the consignor's interest by allowing
him to retain "title" to the goods. The role played by the reservation of title
leads Dean Hawkland to call this type of transaction a "security" consign-
ment." The second function of consignments is to effect retail price main-
tenance." While antitrust laws prohibit many price fixing arrangements
between manufacturer and retailer, a consignment is a bailment situation in
which the goods continue to belong to the consignor even though the con-
signee has possession of them. Thus, the consignor can set his own prices
since the antitrust laws do not prevent one from fixing the price of his own
goods.17 Because the object of this type of consignment is to fix prices, the
consignor insists on a particular price and constantly checks the compliance
with the arrangement. The courts view this type of transaction as a section
2-326 consignment according to Dean Hawkland and not as a security trans-
action." These two functions form the basis for this "intended as security"
test. If the particular consignment involved is intended as a marketing con-
11 U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1952 version).
12 154 S.E.2d 886 (Ga. App. 1967).
13 See Hawkland, supra note 4, at 397-400, 403-05.
14 Id. at 404.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 399, 404.
17 Id. at 399.
18 Id. at 400, 404-05.
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cession to the dealer, a security transaction is involved, and Article 9 would
govern. If the consignment is intended to fix prices, on the other hand, it
would be a "true consignment," not "intended as security," and Article 2
would govern. Under this functional approach all one has to do is decide which
function is "intended" and the problem is solved.
The test, however, is inadequate when generally applied since some
transactions may include elements of both functions. 19 Dean Hawkland
seems to believe that the consignor and consignee will both view the con-
signment as fulfilling the same function. This may not always be true. The
consignor may want to fix his own prices, but it may well be that the con-
signee views the transaction as one intended primarily for the purpose of
securing a market for the consignor's goods. If both intentions are involved,
the test leaves the problem completely unanswered because the court will be
unable to place the consignment in one category in order to determine which
Article will apply. In addition, even if the parties do intend only one func-
tion, it may still be very difficult for a court to decide which function is
actually intended because the original intention may not succeed when the
consignment is effectuated. For example, although price fixing was intended,
the consignee may lower the price to get more business, and the consignor
may not object because of a resulting rise in sales. A court would have
difficulty finding a price-fixing consignment if, in fact, it is the consignee
who has set the price.
A second test, rejecting the Hawkland test, suggests that, in determin-
ing the intent of the parties, the court should look beyond the practical
function of the transaction and examine the financial position of the con-
signee, the past practices of the parties, and the agreement itself. 2° However,
even if employed in conjunction with Dean Hawkland's functional approach,
these factors may still be inconclusive. For example, if the parties had never
dealt with each other the test is severely narrowed. Further, their financial
position may give no clues as to the nature of the transaction. Of course, if
the consignee were financially sound there would be less fear of a misappro-
priation of the goods, and the consignor would have little reason to look to the
reservation of the title to secure his interest. This approach cannot be con-
clusive, however, because the consignor may want to secure his interest re-
gardless of the consignee's financial position. Finally, any examination of the
agreement may be unreliable. It could be just a facade designed to permit
the "consignor" to get priority over the goods.
A better approach is suggested by a recent case which did consider the
"intended as security" issue."' This case held that the parties' intentions
should be construed in light of the facts and circumstances existing when the
contract was signed. Under this approach, all factors which shed light on
the parties' intent would be considered. Examples of such factors include:
(1) the type of goods involved; (2) the size of the consignee's clientele; and
ID Comment, Commercial Transactions: Consignors, Creditors and the U.C.C., 19
Okla. L. Rev. 407, 411 (1966).
20 Id.
21 In re Transcontinental Indus., Inc., Bankruptcy Nos. 51115, 51503, 3 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 325 (N.D, Ga. Oct. 29, 1965).
65
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
(3) the general community practice of marketing similar goods. If the goods
are easily sold, the consignoi will have less cause to be concerned with secur-
ing his interest because the consignee will remain solvent and will wish to
continue his relationship with the consignor. These facts may indicate a con-
signment governed by section 2-326. The size of the consignee's clientele may
add to this effect. If the clientele is large and affluent the goods are more
likely to sell, and again the consignor will have less need to secure his interest.
Finally, a consideration of the current community practices in marketing
similar goods may aid a court confronted with a difficult factual situation in
deciding the type of consignment involved.
A second problem concerning the applicability of section 2-326 centers
around the meaning of the phrase "buyer's possession" in section 2-326(2).
Specifically, section 2-326(2) states that "goods held on sale or return are
subject to such claims while in the buyer's possession," and section 2-326(3)
provides, "Where goods are delivered to a person for sale and such person
maintains a place of business at which he deals in goods of the kind involved
. . . then with respect to claims of creditors of the person conducting the
business the goods are deemed to be on sale or return." Although the goods
must be in the buyer's possession for the creditor to prevail, a problem arises
if the goods are not physically located at the consignee's place of business.
Suppose, for example, that the consigned goods are in various stores and
warehouses not owned by the consignee and all he has are inventory sheets
stating the location of the goods. Whether "possession" demands that the
consignee have the goods at his place of business or whether the inventory
sheets are adequate to protect the creditor under section 2-326 is an impor-
tant interpretive question.
The first interpretation was followed in In re Mincow Bag Co.22 There
the consignor delivered goods to specified chain and department stores
throughout the country. The stores were to remit the sales proceeds to the
consignee after the goods were sold. The court held that since the sales were
not made at the consignee's place of business nor made by the consignee at
the department stores, section 2-326 was not applicable to the case. While
this result may follow from an interpretation of the language defining "pos-
session" to mean "actual possession," it is arguable that such an interpreta-
tion is too restrictive in light of the purposes behind section 2-326. The court
in Mincow stated that
the section was intended to cover a situation where the possession
and offering for sale of another's merchandise presumably led to
extensions of credit in the belief that the merchandise was owned by
the possessor. No such extensions of credit to Mincow can reason-
ably be presumed to have resulted, however, from the possession and
sale of [the consignor's] merchandise by chain stores scattered
throughout the country.28
While the first sentence is a fair statement of section 2-326's purpose, the
22 279 N.Y.S.2d 306 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
23 Id. at 308.
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second sentence, if applied generally, would undercut and restrict the goal of
protecting unwary creditors.
It is realistic to assume that a consignee, like the one in Mincow, could
maintain a large business by handling goods on consignment and using
department stores as his selling agents. The consigned goods would probably
be recorded on documents denoting his stock in trade which he could present
to a creditor to show the existence of collateral for a loan. If these notations
did not indicate that the goods were on consignment, the creditor would
probably assume that they were owned outright by the consignee. This is
exactly the type of situation that section 2-326 purports to cover since the
consignee's ostensible ownership would deceive an innocent creditor who
relied on, in this case, "constructive" possession. For example, consider two
consignees, one who has the goods in a department store, and the other who
keeps the goods in his own stockroom. There is no logical reason to include
the latter within the coverage of section 2-326 and not the former since in
both cases it is a concealed consignment that creates trouble and in
both cases the consignment can be effectively concealed. Even a cautious
creditor who calls the department stores to check on the existence of the goods
may not uncover the consignment unless he specifically inquires about the
consignee's activities. It is submitted, then, that the consignee's possession of
documents which indicate an ostensible ownership of goods is as deceptive to
the unwary creditor as the consignee's actual possession of the goods, and that
"constructive" possession should be included within the meaning of "buyer's
possession." To insure that the court's interpretation will be sufficiently broad,
section 2-326(2) should be amended to read, "[G]oods held on sale or return
are subject to such claims while in the buyer's possession or under a certifi-
cate indicating the buyer's right to possession."
Another problem faced by the courts in determining the applicability
of section 2-326 is the interpretation of the requirement that the consignee
deal "in goods of the kind involved." The ambiguity of this phrase, which
could mean anything from an exact kind to a general class of goods, presents
a practical problem of just how broadly a court should construe it. A case
exemplifying this problem in interpretation is General Elec. Co. v. Pettingell
Supply Co. 24 A dealer received a consignment of large industrial lamps. The
problem arose because only these industrial lamps were on consignment and
they amounted to only 25% of the consignee's business. Thus, it might be
argued that the consignee is not a dealer in "goods of the kind involved" and,
therefore, the transaction is not governed by section 2-326. For example, if
the remaining 75% of the consignee's business were in household bulbs, a
narrow interpretation would hold the consignee to be a dealer in household
bulbs and not in industrial lamps. The court in Pettingell, however, inter-
preted the phrase broadly and stated that "goods of the kind" does not
restrict the relevant business to dealing in the precise kind of electrical goods.
They saw the consignee not as a dealer in large lamps, but rather as a seller
of electrical merchandise generally and, therefore, held the section applicable.
There are analytically, two distinct problems with the phrase "goods of
the kind." The first problem arises from the purpose of section 2-326 to
24 347 Mass. 631, 199 N.E.2d 326 (1964).
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protect creditors. If the courts narrowly interpret the phrase to mean "goods
of an exact type" rather than "general class," this purpose will not be carried
out. For example, if a television dealer has sold one brand for years and
obtains a loan against a small amount of a second brand which has been
received on consignment, the court should recognize, in applying section 2-
326, that the consignee is a television dealer and not draw subtle distinctions
such as the name brand. Instead, the court should primarily decide whether
the consignee's possession of the goods was sufficient under the circumstances
to deceive a creditor. The second problem arises from the expectations of con-
signors who look to the Code for guidance. If a consignor is unable to predict
whether a court will construe "goods of the kind" narrowly or broadly, he
will not be sure in close situations whether section 2-326 will govern the trans-
action. Thus, he will not know whether to comply with the section's perfect-
ing25 provisions. Take, for example, a consignee whose sales in consigned
large lamps are only I% of his business while the other 99% consists of
selling industrial machinery. While an interpretation limiting the meaning of
the phrase to "exact type of goods" would not find him a dealer in large
lamps, extending the meaning of the phrase to "general class of goods" might
find him a dealer in industrial supplies and include large lamps among them.
The latter interpretation would invoke section 2-326 while the former would
exclude it.
To resolve these problems, the phrase "goods of the kind" should be
changed to promote only a broad interpretation. This would comport with
the purpose of section 2-326 and would protect the consignor's expectations
by limiting the potentiality for diverse interpretation. It is submitted, then,
that section 2-326(3) be amended to read, " 1G loods of the general kind in-
volved." Although still open to interpretation, this change should discourage
courts from reading the phrase to mean "goods of the exact type" and thereby
promote the adoption of interpretations including a broader class of goods.
A further problem in determining the applicability of section 2-326
hinges on the requirement that the goods be delivered to the consignee "for
sale." The following hypothetical will illustrate the difficulties posed. Sup-
pose a television dealer handles five brands. Four brands are actually sold
by him, but one brand is on consignment and is not sold but delivered to
customers who negotiate directly with the manufacturer. In this way, the con-
signee becomes a mere distributor. This situation permits the same kind of
deception which occurs when the unwary creditor lends money on an inven-
tory of consigned goods. However, since the goods were not delivered "for
sale" by the consignee, it is arguable that section 2-326(3) is not complied
with and the creditor will not be protected. While it is also arguable that
section 2-326 does apply by interpreting "for sale" to mean "for purposes of
sale" by either the consignor or consignee, this is a broad interpretation and
the courts have strictly interpreted other phrases in section 2-326. 20 In addi-
tion, the entire first sentence of section 2-326(3) concerns the consignee's
25 "Perfecting" refers to the steps provided in subsections 2-326(3)(a), (b), and
(c), whereby the consignor can protect his interest in the consigned goods.
26 For an example of strict interpretation see discussion of the "possession" issue
p. 66-67 supra.
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business. This supports the interpretation that he is the one required to do
the actual selling. The existence of conflicting interpretations at least shows
the ambiguity in the phrase as it now stands.
This problem was brought up in Pettingell, but wasn't decided because
26% of the consignee's receipts of the disputed goods were direct sales and
therefore complied with the "for sale" requirement. Suppose, however, that
none were direct sales and thus the consignee became a pure distributor.
One writer feels this wouldn't have mattered and the creditor would have
been protected anyway. 27 This is a sensible view and does comport with the
purpose of section 2-326 because the creditor may be deceived by the fact
that the goods are in the distributor's possession regardless of whether his
ultimate authority is to sell or distribute them. Thus, if the courts do address
themselves to the purpose of section 2-326 rather than handle the problem
on a purely technical and semantic basis, the above interpretation should
prevail. However, since the courts may react restrictively:2s it would be ad-
visable to change the U.C.C. to include the words "or distribution" in sec-
tion 2-326(3). Such a change would read, "Where goods are delivered to a
person for sale, or distribution, and such person . . .
Once the question of the applicability of section 2-326 to the particular
transaction has been determined, the court must consider whether the con-
signor has protected himself from the consignee's creditors. Under sections
2-326(a), (b), and (c) the consignor is protected if he:
(a) complies with an applicable law providing for a consignor's
interest or the like to be evidenced by a sign, or
(b) establishes that the person conducting the business is generally
known by his creditors to be substantially engaged in selling
the goods of others, or
(c) complies with the filing provisions of the Article on Secured
Transactions (Article 9).
Various interpretive issues have developed in applying these provisions.
The first question involves the interpretation of subsection 3(a) which
provides for perfection by complying with an applicable sign law. The appli-
cation of this subsection unfortunately may lead to an inequitable result as
illustrated by In re Downtown Drugstore, Two record racks in the
store had a label stating that the records belonged to the consignor. The
referee pointed out that Pennsylvania has no statutory provision for sign
laws and therefore held that the consignor was not protected under section
2-326(3)(a). This indicates that a consignor, although posting clear notice
of the consignment, would go unprotected under this provision unless the
particular jurisdiction had an explicit statute allowing such a procedure.
Exemplifying this inequitable result, suppose a consignor had the same sign
27 Comment, Commercial Transactions: U.C.C. Section 2-326 and Creditor's Rights
to Consigned Goods, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 547, 549-50 (1965).
28 Although U.C.C. § 1-102(1) states, "This Act shall be liberally construed and
applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies," this does not guarantee such
an interpretation. The buyer's "possession" issue, as noted above, exemplifies an inter-
pretation which is not in conformity with this general guideline.
29 Bankruptcy No. 28442, 3 13.C.C. Rep. Serv. 27 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 3, 1965).
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on identical merchandise in two states. One sign should not be adequate and
the other inadequate simply because only one state has a sign law. This strict
adherence to a statutory provision is also disturbing in light of the fact that
the 1956 Recommendations to the Code actually increased the possibility of
consignors using a sign. The Code was changed from laws "requiring" signs
to laws "providing for" signs. While this did enlarge the category of such
laws, the Permanent Editorial Board stopped short of making such laws un-
necessary.
In addition, problems may well arise under subsection 3(a) with respect
to the expectations of future consignors. If they look to the U.C.C. for guid-
ance in perfecting their interests, they may think that since their state has
adopted the subsection, it is a valid way to perfect. In this way a consignor
could think he was protecting himself, yet fail to do so. This problem of
misleading the consignor is especially important since few states have sign
laws," yet only California has omitted subsection 3(a) from the Code'
Therefore, it would be wise to change the Code and make the require-
ment one of adequate notice to the creditor rather than the existence of an
explicit statutory sign-law provision. The reason for this lies in the purpose
of section 2-326; if the creditor is actually warned, the section should not
protect him since he is no longer deceived by the consignee's possession. Thus,
the amended section might read, "provides by a conspicuous sign notice of
the consignor's interest." This change should resolve the problem with sub-
section 3(a) as it now stands.
A similar problem of interpretation and application arises in connection
with the operative effect of section 2-326(3) (b) on the expectations of the
parties. Under the subsection a consignor is protected if the consignee is
"generally known by his creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the
goods of others." (Emphasis added.) The italicized phrases are so general
that few potential consignors could be confident that their interests would
be protected.32 As an example of the problem, In re Griffin" should be re-
viewed. In this case, the consignee, in addition to his furniture cleaning
business, sold new and used furniture which was advertised by a sign in his
store window. The used furniture was consigned to him and trouble devel-
oped when the consignee's landlord levied on all the goods for delinquent
rent. This led to litigation between the consignors of the used furniture and
the landlord. The court, by grouping several factors together, found subsec-
tion 3 (b) to be complied with and therefore protected the consignors. These
decisive factors were: (1) furniture cleaning could only apply to others'
property; (2) there was no new furniture on the premises; (3) new and
used furniture was on the sign, thereby giving notice that what was being
disposed of were the articles of others. Since a potential consignor may not
38 See 2 W. Hawkland, A Transactional Guide to the Uniform Commercial Code
753 (1964).
31 This confusion was the precise reason California omitted subsection 3(a). See
Committee on the Commercial Code of the Cal. State Bar, The Uniform Commercial
Code, 37 Cal. S.B.J. 117, 136-37 (1962).
82 See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 1107; Hawkland, supra note 28, at 748.
88 1 U.C.C. Rep, Serv. 492 (W.D. Pa. April 28, 1960).
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even think of such an outcome, Iet alone depend on it, his ability to rely on
the section for protection may be extremely limited. Indeed, it may be inferred
from the ambiguity of the subsection that it was intended to protect the
unwitting consignor if a court found, in retrospect, that he complied with
section 2-326. Although such an intention would protect the consignor in some
situations, it restricts the subsection's usefulness as it offers little help to the
potential consignor who'looks to the Code for protection.
The outcome of these problems is that, in most states, the consignor who
follows the Code is virtually forced to file under subsection 3(c). This is not a
bad result, however, because filing certainly affords adequate protection for
the consignor. In fact, if a valuable amount of goods are involved, filing is
perhaps the only satisfactory way for a consignor to protect himself. The
other subsections, even if amended, would not always offer the same degree of
reliability. In some situations, however, filing may be too expensive, or other-
wise impractical. The draftsmen of the Code seem to have recognized this
when they expressly provided alternatives.
The reasoning in Grif in suggests a possible solution and a more viable
alternative to filing. The court stressed notice and the importance of the sign,
seemingly combining subsections 3(a) and 3 (b). Such a step would result in
one section with the sole requirement being adequate notice to creditors with-
out specifying precisely how such notice is to be given. The amended section
might state that the consignor is protected if he, "provides adequate notice
to creditors of the consignor's interest." While filing would still be preferable
in many cases because it avoids the doubts one may have about what consti-
tutes adequate notice, the combination of 3(a) and 3 (b) still offers a better
alternative than the present Code. This conclusion is based on the fact that
adequate notice includes not only actual notice but knowledge of facts that
give a "reason to know" that some fact exists 3 4 This is an objective test
with the issue being "would a person in the position of this person have had
reason to know the crucial fact?"" This alternative could be especially useful
if a small amount of consigned goods are involved in a state with no sign law.
This comment has sought to analyze the various issues that have arisen
under section 2-326. The major problems involve the interpretation of various
phrases in the section to determine its applicability to particular factual
situations; and the interpretation and application of the provisions protect-
ing the consignor's interest in the consigned goods. The resolution of these
problems, which the suggested interpretations and amendments are designed
to promote, should make section 2-326 a more meaningful guide to consign-
ors, consignees and their creditors.
JOHN HICINBOTHEM
34 See U.C.C. § 1-201(25), for the Code definition of "notice,"
35 Mentschikoff, Highlights of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 Modern L. Rev.
167, 169 (1964).
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